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THE EPISTEMIC NEUTRALITY OF THE
"MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS":
MILTON, MILL, BRANDEIS, AND HOLMES ON
FALSEHOOD AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
CHRISTOPH BEZEMEK
ABSTRACT
For quite some time it was far from certain that false state-
ments of fact were to be considered protected speech. While
"[u]nder the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea,"
Justice Powell wrote for a Supreme Court majority in 1974, "there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the inten-
tional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest
in 'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' debate on public issues."
Numerous decisions relied and elaborated on that rationale.
In 2012 it was altered significantly, when the Supreme Court over-
turned a conviction based on a statute prohibiting any false repre-
sentation to have been awarded military decorations. "Our constitu-
tional tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania's
Ministry of Truth," Justice Kennedy emphasized on behalf of the plu-
rality, drawing on Brandeis and Holmes that "the remedy for speech
that is false. . is speech that is true." Also, "a false statement (even if
made deliberately to mislead)," Justice Breyer added in his concur-
rence, relying on positions originally developed by Mill, "can pro-
mote a form of thought that ultimately helps realize the truth."
* Associate Professor of Law, IOER - WU, Welthandelsplatz 1, D3, 1020 Vienna
christoph.bezemek@wu.ac.at. This Article was originally drafted as a contribu-
tion to "Law and Fictional Discourse," a conference held at the Yale University
Whitney Humanities Center on May 19-21, 2015. 1 am most grateful to Hans
Lind for organizing this event and inviting me to participate as well as to audi-
ence for the lively discussion. Particular thanks to Michael Holoubek, Frederick
Schauer, Michael Steven Green and Michael Potacs for their comments on an
earlier draft of this Article and to Gisela Kristoferitsch and Tamara Schondorfer
for their support in finishing the manuscript.
The result is to be applauded: Speech not causing any legally
cognizable harm, beyond being merely erroneous, is indeed entitled
to comprehensive First Amendment protection. The reasoning, how-
ever, is not: Even if Mill, Brandeis, and Holmes are regularly lumped
together when it comes to arguing in favor of a robust protection of
falsehood, their positions as to whether and why false statements of
fact ought to be shielded against government intervention are all too
different to provide a single, coherent rationale. The following Arti-
cle makes the argument that among the concepts of Mill, Brandeis,
and Holmes, only the latter position advocates consistently in favor
of true epistemic neutrality of the marketplace of discussion.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Meet Xavier Alvarez
In 2007, Xavier Alvarez attended his first public meeting as a
board member of the Three Valley Water District Board in
Claremont, California.' At that time he was presumably not aware
that he was about to make First Amendment history, introducing
himself by stating: "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the
year 2001. Back in 1987, 1 was awarded the Congressional Medal of
Honor. I got wounded many times by the same guy. I'm still around."2
None of this was true (except for the evident fact that he was still
around, of course).3 And yet, none of this was said in order to secure
employment, financial benefits, or privileges.4 Mr. Alvarez had made
it up to gain the respect of his peers.5
However, shortly thereafter, he was exposed and, making
matters worse, indicted under the Stolen Valor Act, a federal statute
making it a misdemeanor to falsely represent oneself as having re-
I United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 1201.
4 Id.
s Id.
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ceived any U.S. military decoration or medal.6 Subsequently, Mr. Al-
varez was sentenced to three years' probation, 416 hours of commu-
nity service, and a $ 5000 fine.7 He appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit on First Amendment grounds.8 The court de-
clared the Act unconstitutional and reversed the conviction.9
The Supreme Court affirmed and, in doing so, surprised
many commentators who assumed, based on the Court's prior case
law,10 that "false facts ... have limited or no constitutional value.""
Indeed, Alvarez apparently foiled the rationale underlying numerous
previous decisions which held that even though "[u]nder the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea .... there is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact . . .. Neither the intention-
al lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate' on public issues."12. Ac-
6 18 U.S.C. § 704 (b)-(c) (2005).
7 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
11 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL.
L. R. 1, 38 (2012).
12 418 U.S. at 339-40. See also, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)
("Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment,
and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation.").
Of course, initially the Court's case law pointed in a different direction.
New York Times v. Sullivan rather broadly granted First Amendment protection
to incorrect factual speech: "[E]rroneous statement," Justice Brennan empha-
sized, "is inevitable in free debate, and... must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive"' 376
U.S. 254, 271-280 (1964) (referring to NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433
(1963)). Brennan did not stop at condoning such utterances as a necessary evil,
see Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 1203 (2008), pointing to their intrinsic value in achieving the
goals pursued by free speech, as, quoting John Stuart Mill, "Even a false state-
ment may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it
brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced
by its collision with error."' Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, Oxford: Blackwell 15 (1947)).
Some months later, however, the Court put Sullivan in perspective. These
arguments in favor of false statements of fact would not apply as far as inten-
tional falsehood was concerned. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)
("Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exer-
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cordingly, "[s]preading false information in and of itself carries no
First Amendment credentials."'3 "[F]alse statements [were] not
[considered to be] immunized by the First Amendment right to free-
dom of speech"'4 because they "harm both the subject of the false-
hood and the readers of the statement."15 They were considered
"particularly valueless; [as] they interfere with the truth-seeking
function of the marketplace of ideas,"'6 and thus "unprotected for
their own sake."17
B. Oceania's Ministry of Truth
Even if not decided by a clear majority, Alvarez put things in
perspective. While disagreeing about the general approach to be tak-
en and the standard to be applied, the plurality opinion and the con-
currence readily agree that false statements of fact are indeed pro-
tected by the First Amendment. They dismiss the quotations referred
to before as mere "isolated statements," which do not allow for the
conclusion "that false statements, as a general rule, are beyond con-
stitutional protection,"18 but rather are to be understood in light of
their object and purpose: "These quotations all derive from cases
discussing defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm
associated with a false statement, such as an invasion of privacy or
the costs of vexatious litigation."' 9 They do not "mean 'no protection
cise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie ... should enjoy a
like immunity .... For the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with
the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which
economic, social, or political change is to be effected .... Hence [the Court stat-
ed] the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection."); see also Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967).
13 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,171 (1979).
14 Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983).
Is Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984).
16 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
17 BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002).
18 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2544-45 (2012) (plurality opinion).
19 Id. at 2545.
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at all,"' 2 0 as, "[tihe Court has never endorsed the categorical rule ...
that false statements receive no First Amendment protection."21 A
position which per se could not be aligned with a:
constitutional tradition stand[ing] against the
idea that we need Oceania's Ministry of Truth
.... Were the Court to hold that the interest in
truthful discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a
ban on speech, absent any evidence that the
speech was used to gain a material advantage, it
would give government a broad censorial power
unprecedented in this Court's cases or in our
constitutional tradition.22
Relying on Brandeis's concurring opinion in Whitney v. California23
and Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States,24 Kennedy pointed
out that "[t]he remedy for speech that is false [has to be] speech that
is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society. The response to
the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened;
to the straightout lie, the simple truth."25
Alvarez is a remarkable decision from the perspective of First
Amendment doctrine,26 yet even more so from the perspective of
20 Id. at 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally Mark TushnetJustice
Breyer and the Partial DeDoctrinalization of Free Speech Law, 128 HARv. L. REV.
508, 513-14 (2014) (discussing Breyer's approach in Alvarez).
2 1Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2545 (plurality opinion).
22 Id. at 2547-48 referring to GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) ("Were this law to be
sustained, there could be an endless list of subjects the National Government or
the States could single out.").
23 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
24 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25 Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2550 (plurality opinion).
26 See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of
Free Speech Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v.
Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499 (2012). Of course, quite a large number of eminent
scholars previously postulated the idea that falsity per se was not bereft of any
First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment
jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 238 (1992); Paul
Horwitz, The First Amendment's Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445,
4630 (2012); Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV.
897 (2010); Jonathan Varat, Deception and the First Amendment, 53 UCLA L. REV.
1107 (2006); Mark Tushnet, "Telling Me Lies": The Constitutionality of Regulat-
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free speech theory, as the plurality and the concurrence address, re-
phrase, and (eventually) extend related, albeit not identical, argu-
ments underlying the very concept of free speech. Justice Kennedy
relies on Brandeis's concept of "more speech as the remedy to be ap-
plied ... to expose falsehood and fallacies through discussion,"27 and
on Holmes's famed theory "that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."28
Alternatively, Justice Breyer refers to John Stuart Mill's argument to
protect false statements of fact as they allowed for "the clearer per-
ception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision
with error."29
II. MILTON, MILL, HOLMES, AND BRANDEIS
Neither approach is self-explanatory. It is far from evident
that "more speech" adequately remedies intentional falsehood, how
"false statements of fact" are to be dealt with in "the marketplace of
ideas,"3 0 or whether the question at hand may be answered by rely-
ing on Mill's On Liberty in the first place. Indeed, some scholars em-
phasize that Mill's work was to be understood in the tradition of
John Milton31 and was thus occupied with true ideas rather than fac-
tual truth.32
ing False Statements of Fact, in HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY
WORKING PAPER SERIEs 2 (2011), http://bit.1y/lKFSoqu.
27 Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2550 (plurality opinion) (quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
28 Id. (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
29 Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (citation omitted).
30 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (describing false
statements of fact as interference with the truth-seeking function of the mar-
ketplace of ideas).
31 It is well-established that Milton's argument served as a role-model for Mill's
approach. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6
(1989); see also ALAN HAWORTH, FREE SPEECH 3 (1998).
32 Bhagwat, supra note 11 at 42 (2012).
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A. Let Her and Falsehood Grapple
Evaluating Milton's position, it is safe to assume that his
famed statement, "[S]o Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by li-
censing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and False-
hood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and
open encounter,"33 is not directed at differing factual statements, but
rather at competing ideological convictions. Eventually, according to
Milton's argument, truth will prevail "though all the windes of
doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth."3 4 The Areopagitica is a
plea for extensive freedom of political and theological discussion and
against prior restriction of those arguments:35 "Where there is much
desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writ-
ing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the
making."36
It is this dialectical process Milton aims to promote,37 which
is why he takes a stand against censorship as "the stop of Truth ...
by hindering and cropping the discovery that might bee yet further
made both in religious and Civill Wisdome."38 Mere factual state-
ments were not the subject of his "Speech . . . for the Liberty of
Unlicens'd Printing."39 And thus, "although Milton and others be-
lieved that their religious and political views reflected something
true about the world, those truths were sufficiently elusive and con-
troversial that even using the words 'true' and 'false' in that context,
let alone 'fact,' seems somewhat dissonant."40 It is this background
3 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (Richard C. Jebb ed., Cambridge University Press
1918) (1644) (sic) (hereinafter AREOPAGITICA).
3 Id.; see also Ephesians 4:14 (King James) ("That we henceforth be no more
children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by
the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive.").
3 See Vincent Blasi, John Milton's Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment,
13 COMMS. LAWYER 1, 15 (1995) (demonstrating that Milton is not eager to in-
clude catholic doctrine).
36 Milton, supra note 33, at 52.
3 See Donald Guss, Enlightenment as Process: Milton and Habermas, PUBS. MoD.
LANG. Ass'N AM. 1156, 1159-60 (1991).
38 Milton, supra note 33, at 6.
3 The subtitle of Milton's AREOPAGITICA.
40 Schauer, supra note 26, at 903.
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against which we have to understand his proposition that falsehood
"as the dust and cinders of our feet .. . may yet serve to polish and
brighten the armoury of Truth;"41 not to prove the factual accuracy
but rather to demonstrate the intellectual rigor of a statement.
B. Always Some Other Explanation Possible
True ideas, rather than factual truth, are also at the center of
John Stuart Mill's defense of free speech. Even if differing from Mil-
ton in perceiving the advantage of truth over falsehood rather in its
persistence than in its vigor,42 Mill also saw the latter as a necessary
touchstone of the former which "if ... not fully, frequently, and fear-
lessly discussed ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth."4 3
Following Milton, he refers to ideological debate, the re-
striction of which not only may suppress "true" arguments, but also,
irrespective of this attribution, may obstruct rational discourse.44 In
Mill's perception, therefore, such arguments are mainly focused on
41 Milton, supra note 33, at 62-63. Additionally, consider the remark concerning
"bad books, that ... to a discreet and judicious reader serve in many respects to
discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate. " Id. This thought, however, is
already to be found in Pliny's writings: "Nullus est liber tam malus, ut non
aliqua parte prosit." DICTIONARY OF LATIN QUOTATIONS 295 (H.T. Rile ed., 1866).
42 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 52-54 (2d ed. 1859) ("But, indeed, the dictum
that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant false-
hoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces,
but which all experience refutes . . . . It is a piece of idle sentimentality that
truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing
against the dungeon and the stake. Men are not more zealous for truth than
they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social
penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. The real
advantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may
be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will
generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances
falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until
it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it").
43 Mill, supra note 42, at 64; cf David 0. Brink, Millian Principles, Freedom of Ex-
pression, and Hate Speech, 7 LEGAL THEORY 119, 123 (2001).
4 Cf C. L. Ten, Introduction to Mill's On Liberty, 30 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF
IDEAS 47, XX (2008); see also D.H. Monro, Liberty of expression: its grounds and
limits (II), 13 INQUIRY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 238, XX (1970).
"morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life," 45
with one most fascinating exception: "[O]n a subject like mathemat-
ics," Mill stated, "there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side
of the question. The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical
truths is, that all the argument is on one side. There are no objec-
tions, and no answers to objections."46
Yet it is questionable whether this qualification justifies to
presuppose that factual statements are generally excluded from
Mill's approach.47 Drawing on the teachings of Logical Positivism, we
may assume that mathematical propositions, being necessarily true
because of their analytical (tautological) character,48 "[do not] pro-
vide any information about any matter of fact."4 9 Thus, excluding
mathematics may only serve to clarify that Mill's argument applies
solely to synthetic propositions to be empirically validated.
Such an objection, however, again seems beside the point
when it comes to somebody like Mill who, as his writings amply
demonstrate, epistemologically rejects the validity of 6 priori propo-
sitions.50 To him, "[t]here is no knowledge A priori; no truths cog-
nizable by the mind's inward light, and grounded on intuitive evi-
dence. Sensation and the mind's consciousness of its own acts, are
not only the exclusive sources, but the sole materials of our
knowledge."5
45 See Schauer, supra note 26, at 905 (citation omitted).
46 Mill, supra note 42 at 66.
47 See KEVIN O'RoURKE, JOHN STUART MILL AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION - THE GENESIS
OF A THEORY 85 (2001).
48 See RUDOLF CARNAP, THE LOGICAL SYNTAX OF LANGUAGE 7 (1934); see also Peter
Koellner, Carnap on the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics 3 (2009).
49 See ALFRED AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 73 (Reprint ed., 1971) (1936). See
also Carnap, supra note 48, at 41; Peter Koellner, Truth in Mathematics: The
Question of Pluralism, in NEW WAVES OF PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 80, 86 (Otivio
Bueno and 0ystein Linnebo ed., 2009).
50 See, e.g., GEOFFREY SCARRE, LOGIC AND REALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART
MILL 90 (1989), C. S. Jenkins, A Priori Knowledge: Debates and Developments,
Philosophy Compass, 436, 439-40 (2008) or ALBERT CASULLO, ESSAYS ON A PRIORI
KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION 137-140 (2012); For a general introduction see
JOHN R. FITZPATRICK, STARTING WITH MILL 22-25 (2010).
s1 John Stuart Mill, Coleridge (1840), reprinted in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN
STUART MILL, VOLUME X - ESSAYS ON ETHICS, RELIGION, AND SOCIETY 119, 125 (John M
Robson ed., 1969).
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Consistently, according to Mill, "the truths of mathematics,
and . . . the peculiar certainty attributed to them [are but] an illu-
sion,"52 relying on the abstraction of natural objects and thus even-
tually on empirical hypothesis.53 This is why the validity of mathe-
matical assumptions rests on preconditions that may only be
understood as approximation to reality but not redeemed.54 There-
fore, it may be accepted "that the peculiar certainty ascribed to it, on
account of which its propositions are called Necessary Truths, is fic-
titious and hypothetical, being true in no other sense than that those
propositions legitimately follow from the hypothesis of the truth of
premises which are avowedly mere approximations to truth."55
However, even this qualification does not object to the con-
sistency of propositions within the system of general arithmetic.56 As
it is certain, "that 1 is always equal in number to 1 and ... where the
mere number of objects . . . is all that is material, the conclusions of
arithmetic so far as they go to that alone, are true without mixture of
hypothesis."57
In that light, the exception of mathematics from free debate
is to be understood: "[O]n a subject like mathematics . . . there is
nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the question."58 This is
not because arithmetic as a subject was detracted from discourse,
but because the propositions made within its system cannot serve an
antithetic function in the dialectic process of truth-seeking postulat-
ed in the second chapter of Mill's On Liberty.59 When it comes to
52 JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 279 (8th ed. 1882).
53 See Ayer, supra note 49, at 67.
54 MILL, supra note 52, at 312.
55 Id.
56 See generally GoTTLoB FREGE, GRUNDLAGEN DER ARITHMETIK 19 (ed. Felix Meiner
Verlag 1988) (1884) (discussing Mill's arithmetic concept in depth).
17 MILL, supra note 52, at 320.
58 MILL, supra note 42, at 66.
s9 It has to be emphasized that this departs from Mill's earlier thoughts on the
topic as evidenced by his correspondence with the Scottish writer Thomas Car-
lyle in which Mill underlines: "I have not any great notion of the advantage of
what the 'free discussion' men, call the 'collision of opinions,' it being my creed
that Truth is sown and germinates in the mind itself, and is not to be struck out
suddenly like fire from a flint by knocking another hard body against it." Letter




arithmetic, there are no false statements but only incorrect proposi-
tions.
The exclusion of mathematics from the rationale of free de-
bate thus does not allow for the conclusion that Mill's argument
would not apply to statements of fact in the first place. Mill, consist-
ently following an empiricist-inductive method,60 openly embraces
to leave questions of fact to public deliberation: "Even in natural phi-
losophy,61 there is always some other explanation possible of the
same facts; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some
phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other
theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown, and until we
know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our
opinion."62
The differences between the canonical foundations of a free-
speech principle offered by Milton and Mill respectively, in address-
ing whether or not statements of fact are to be included, therefore,
are evident. Still, Mill's argument is concerned with questions of sci-
ence and, even if incidentally, the ideological implications of their
answers. It is their open discussion that shall serve the cathartic
function of open intellectual encounter to combat the apathy feared
as a consequence of its suppression.
Following a utilitarian approach,63 Mill argues not only in fa-
vor of the freedom of-the individual to speak her mind in order to
gain knowledge, but also to develop and deepen her moral faculties.
He also recalls the functions of free debate for society as a whole.64
The second chapter of On Liberty is not a mere plea for liberty of
speech but for liberty of thought and discussion. Right from the very
60 James Zappen, The Logic and Rhetoric of John Stuart Mill, 26 PHILOSOPHY &
RHETORIC 191, 198 (1993). It has to be added, however, that Mill proclaimed
himself not an "empiricist" but an adherent of the "School of Experience." For a
more detailed account, see R.P. Anschutz, The Logicof]. S. Mill, 58 MIND 277, 287
(1949).
61 I.e. natural science.
62 MILL supra, note 42, at 66.
63 See generally, Christopher Miles Coope, Was Mill a Utilitarian?, 10 Utilitas 33
(1998) (pointing out that the extent to which Mill is considered a utilitarian is
subject to continuous academic debate).
64 See Frederick Schauer, On the Relation between Chapters One and Two offohn
Stuart Mill's On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. REv. 571, 584 (2011).
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beginning it recognizes "the peculiar evil of silencing the expression
of an opinion [in the fact] that it is robbing the human race; posterity
as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opin-
ion, still more than those who hold it."65
For Mill, knowledge is "not only something possessed by in-
dividuals, but is also something possessed by societies."66 This
knowledge, however, is to be achieved, defended and affirmed in the
common effort of a dialectic process of speech and counter-speech.67
Mill's argument, as he emphasizes himself, applies to "every subject
on which difference of opinion is possible."68
Therefore, it is dubious whether reliance on Mill is adequate
in light of the facts in Alvarez. If truth depends on "a balance to be
struck between two sets of conflicting reasons,"69 Frederick Schauer
surely is correct: "Mill was not to any appreciable extent addressing
issues of demonstrable and verifiable fact."70
C. Civic Courage
Focusing on the function Mill ascribes to free speech for soci-
ety as a whole, his argument has strikingly close ties to Brandeis's
exposition of a free speech principle in Whitney v. Calfornia,71 which
Kennedy uses to support the plurality opinion in Alvarez.72
Also, Brandeis was convinced "that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people."73 Consistently, he perceived public dis-
cussion as a political duty, as "discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine."7 4 Accord-
ing to Brandeis's theory, free speech serves as the image of an ideal
65 MILL, supra note 42, at 33.
66 Schauer, supra note 64, at 589.
67 See also Irene Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination ofJohn
Stuart Mill's and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.
L. & HUMAN. 35, 62 (2010).
68 MILL, supra note 42, at 66.
69 Id.
70 Schauer, supra note 26, at 905.
71 Whitney, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, I., concurring).
72 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2550-2551 (2012).
73 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
74 Id.
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of "civic courage,"75 influenced essentially by conceptions of attic
democracy.76 For him, the formation of the individual's potential and
its unfolding in society were more than just an end in itself. Liberty
for Brandeis is "both .. . an end[,] and ... a means."77 It therefore is
always in service of "the power of reason as applied through public
discussion."78 In accordance with Mill, 79 in Brandeis's perception,
liberty is privilege as well as duty;so a necessary precondition to
counter the "occasional tyrannies of governing majorities."81
Free and open debate according to his theory ensures the ca-
thartic capability of society; a capability not to be undermined by an
orthodoxy in thought and discussion imposed by the majority. Even
if not to intervene meant not to confront phenomena perceived as
dangerous for society: "Men feared witches and burnt women. It is
the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears."82
Only when "speech may blend into and become action"83 is it
the responsibility of the state to step in: "If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence."84
Brandeis used these phrases in order to refer to political dis-
cussion between citizens thereby fulfilling their duty towards the
community, not to point to fact related demonstrations. Free speech
in his view is an instrument of the common struggle to further the
Is Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & M. L. REV. 653, 682 (1988).
76 See Paul Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis: A Centennial Memoir, 70 HARv. L. REV.
769, 780 (1957).
77 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
78 Id.
79 MILL, supra note 42, at 32. For a more detailed account see C.L. Ten, Mill and
Liberty, 30 JOURNAL OFTHE HISTORYOF IDEAS 47, 52 (1969).
so See, e.g., Daniel Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twen-
ty-First Century, U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 182-83 (1995).
81 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
82 Id.
83 Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 391, 396 (1963).
84 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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public good,a5 as "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of politi-
cal truth."8 6
The optimistic Brandeis, it may be concluded with Steven
Gey, "really seems to have believed that truth existed and could be
realized by normal mortals."87 In this regard his approach differs,
just as the other theories discussed so far, from the picture of free
speech as a marketplace of ideas painted by Oliver Wendell
Holmes.88
D. The Competition of the Market
Prior to elaborating on this, however, one clarification is nec-
essary. Neither Holmes's writings, nor his dissent in Abrams v. United
States,89 to which Justice Kennedy refers in the plurality opinion in
Alvarez, used the phrase "marketplace of ideas."90 As late as 1953, far
more than thirty years after Abrams, Douglas was the first on the Su-
preme Court to make use of it, even if only in a concurring opinion.91
It took nearly fifteen more years until it finally made its way into a
majority opinion, when in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,9 2 Brennan
referred to "[t]he classroom . . . [as a] 'marketplace of ideas"' and
85 See, e.g., Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifi-
cations for Free Speech, 4 J. L. & PoL. 451, 466-67 (1988).
86 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
87 Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worth-
less Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008); see also Edward L. Glaeser & Cass
R. Sunstein, Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (2014);
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 1. POL. PHIL. 175 (2002).
88 However, apart from the question at hand, Holmes and Brandeis differed sig-
nificantly particularly with regard to social reform, which, for Brandeis, was di-
rectly tied to the position of a self-determined and active citizenry. See Sheldon
Novick, The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, SUP. CT. REV. 303, 370-
71 (1991).
89 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, I., dissenting).
90 Evidently the phrase "marketplace of ideas" was used for the first time in a
letter David Newbold wrote to the New York Times in 1935. See Vincent Blasi,
Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, SUP. CT. REv. 1, 13 n.41 (2004).
91 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, I., concurring).
92 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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highlighted that "[t]he Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas."93
Still, the extent to which Holmes's words in Abrams shaped
the concept and thus helped to shape the phrase of a "marketplace of
ideas" is evident:94
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very founda-
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that he best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment.95
The influence Milton and Mill had on Holmes's thought cannot be
denied,96 which is why in scholarship it is oftentimes assumed97 that
Holmes was united with Milton and Mill (and Brandeis, as is some-
times argued)98 in "confidence that truth will not be bested in a fair
fight, to competition in the marketplace of ideas."99
At second glance, however, such a position proves to be un-
tenable. Not only because the image of a marketplace00 hardly
9 Id. at 603.
94 See Thomas W. Joo, The Worst Test of Truth: The "Marketplace of Ideas" as
Faulty Metaphor, 89 TUL. L. REv. 383 (2014) (discussing how the phrase was in-
troduced into the Court's case law).
95 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,-J., dissenting).
6 See Lahav, supra note 85, at 455-57.
97 See Blasi, supra note 90 at 19 (noting that Holmes had read Mill's essay, On
Liberty, in 1919 before writing his dissent in Abrams).
98 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7 (1989); Bernard
Schwartz, Holmes v. Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Ac-
tion?, SUP. CT. REV. 209, 220 (1994).
99 Harry Kalven, Jr., A Commemorative Case Note: Scopes v. State, 27 U. CHI. L.
REV. 505, 516 (1960).
100 See JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 35-36
(2006) (arguing that the "marketplace of ideas" allowing for the highest level of
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matches Milton's approach:101 Milton believed that "[tiruth and un-
derstanding ... [explicitly were] not such wares as to be monopoliz'd
and traded in by tickets and statutes, and standards."10 2 Far more
important is to see that, despite all differences and theoretical pecu-
liarities, Milton, Mill, and Brandeis perceived knowledge and under-
standing at the same time as the objective and the presupposition of
free and open debate. To them, truth, irrespective of the vagueness
inherent to the concept, is an ideal to be pursued in a dialectical pro-
cess of free debate as well as a promise to be carried through by its
means.
Holmes's approach differs significantly from this understand-
ing of free speech as a vehicle in a process of truth-seeking: If "the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market," truth is neither presupposition nor
ideal of such a process but rather its arbitrary result.103 To insinuate
that this argument is based on the assumption "that a process of ro-
bust debate, if uninhibited by governmental interference, will lead to
the discovery of truth,"04 or "that truth will emerge from free com-
petition in the marketplace of ideas,"05 is not convincing. The apoc-
ryphal dictum "magna est veritas et praevalet,"0 6 which clearly did
shape Milton's thought and influenced Mill's and Brandeis's ap-
proach, does not apply to Holmes's.
individual rational choice does not always necessarily lead to truth, justice, or
even an optimum rational outcome).
101 For a deeper analysis of the image of a battle between true and false in Mil-
ton's thought, see HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS
55-56 (1992).
102 MILTON, AREOPAGITICA supra note 33, at 37 ("We must not think to make a sta-
ple commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark and license it like our
broad-cloth, and our woolpacks.").
03Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, I., dissenting).
104 Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, DUKE L.J. 1, 3
(1984).
105 Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Ex-
pression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 667 (1987).
106 III Esdras 4, 41 ("Great is truth, and it prevails."). The version prevalent to-
day, magna est veritas et praevalebit obviously goes back to a distorted account
in Thomas Brooks, The Crown and Glory of Christianity (1662). SIR JAMES GEORGE
FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH: A STUDY IN MAGIC AND RELIGION 837 (Robert Fraser, ed.,
Oxford University Press 1994) (1890).
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Holmes, the Social-Darwinist skeptic107 who pointed out in
his academic writings that "truth may be defined as the system of my
(intellectual) limitations" manifesting itself in "the majority vote of
that nation that could lick all others,"08 does not expect that truth
will prevail, but that whatever prevails has to be considered the
truth.0 9 Truth, however, which has no claim to finality,110 as it is the
ever-temporary result of a permanent struggle not perpetuated for
the reason to tolerate falsehood out of functional considerations but
as an open competition of equitable elements, denied to ever reach a
final result; an antithesis to the claim of final truth.
Drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche, who is sometimes consid-
ered to be Holmes's intellectual counterpart,111 we may say for
Holmes that "the claim that truth exists, setting an end to ignorance
and error [is] among the greatest of temptations. If it was believed,
our determination to scrutiny, research, caution and experiment was
paralyzed; considered outrageous by putting the truth in doubt."112
"Certitude," as Holmes stated shortly before drafting his dis-
sent in Abrams, "is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure
of many things that were not so."113 Truth, we may complement,
again referring to Friedrich Nietzsche, "therefore is even more fatal
107 Holmes may have accepted the attribution skeptic while rejecting to have his
thinking referred to as pragmatic. ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES -
THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 18 (2000). For further discussion of
Holmes's skepticism, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 60 (1998).
108 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918).
109 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1653, 1656 (1990).
110 See Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams
Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1997).
11 See Richard Posner, Introduction, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES ix, xviii (Richard
Posner ed., 1992); David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial
Restraint, 44 DUKE L. J. 449, 464 (1994) ("Holmes's philosophical views were,
with a few instructive divergences, strikingly similar to those of Nietzsche.").
Holmes himself once asserted that he would find in Nietzsche's work "much
that I long have believed, after or independently of him." OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Morris Cohen (August 28, 1924), in
9, THE HOLMES-COHEN CORRESPONDENCE 3, 41 (1948).
112 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, AUS DEM NACHLA9 DER ACHTZIGERJAHRE 814 (Karl Schlechta
ed., Werke III 1954) (own translation).
113 Holmes, supra note 108, at 40.
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than error and ignorance, inhibiting the forces working on
knowledge and enlightenment.""14
The key notion in Holmes's metaphor is, therefore, competi-
tion.115 The various elements facing each other in public debate have
no specific value of their own,116 but draw their potency from the ac-
ceptance of those taking part in the discourse."7 Constitutional pro-
tection of free speech-in perfect accordance with the classical im-
age of the marketplace as space for public deliberation-provides
the forum to decide on that potency and thus to decide between true
and false.118 The result of this competition, "[that] truth,"119 accord-
ing to Holmes is, "the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out."12 0
114 Nietzsche, supra note 112, at 813 (own translation).
115 See Blasi, supra note 90, at 24; see also, Cate, supra note 67 at 58-59; Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REV. 443, 449
(1899) (demonstrating the image Holmes used already two decades before
Abrams of a "struggle for life among competing ideas, and of the ultimate victo-
ry and survival of the strongest").
116 See mutatis mutandis CARL SCHMITT, ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTLICHEN LAGE DES
HEUTIGEN PARLAMENTARISMUs 45-46 (2d ed. 1926) ("It is quite the same that truth
is derived from the free struggle of opinions, as self-unfolded harmony cata-
lyzed by competition. Here is the intellectual core of such thinking, its specific
relation to truth which becomes a mere function of an eternal competition of
opinions. From the perspective of truth this means to renounce a definitive re-
sult.") (own translation).
117 See R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. EcoN.
REV. 384, 389-90 (1974) (providing an economic assessment).
118 See Stanley Fish, Fraught with Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First
Amendment, 64 U. COLo. L. REV. 1061, 1076 (1993).
"19 See Blasi supra note 110, at 1346 (1997); see also Vincent Blasi, Shouting
"Fire!" in a Theatre and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 535, 565 (2011);
see generally Cate, supra note 67, at 70-71 (2010) (providing additional context
surrounding the Holmes quote).
120 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The relationship between the last part of the sentence and its prior parts is dis-
puted in scholarship. Vincent Blasi assumes it has distinct significance for
Holmes's concept of truth, as "the case for protecting speech in the face of the
harms it might cause depends on the further proposition that knowing the truth
is a value of overriding importance." Blasi, supra note 90, at 16.
Thus, free speech, also according to Holmes's perception, serves the pur-
suit of truth. Blasi bases his hypothesis on Holmes's sometimes, it has to be ad-
mitted, quite enigmatic style. Cf Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, I., dissenting)
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Such a theory may have considerable costs if realized. Costs,
however, that Holmes is ready to bear:121 "If in the long run the be-
("[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ide-
as-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.").
In the given context this syntactically allows for several interpretations: in
particular, to view the word that in the last part of the sentence as a conditional
instead of demonstrative pronoun. As internal evidence of his reading, Blasi of-
fers, "that earlier in the same sentence, in clauses structurally parallel to the
clause at issue, Holmes twice used the word 'that' as a conjunction rather than
an adjective: 'they may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired ...
that the best test of truth."' Blasi, supra note 90, at 16 (quoting Abrams, 250 U.S.
at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
This structural exegesis, however, is not convincing. On the one hand, be-
cause Holmes, whom even his critics praised for his brilliant style, see Josal
Rogat & James M. O'Fallon, Mr. justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion - The Speech
Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1388 (1984), obviously did not seek to attract by
diversification. Particularly in Abrams, Holmes uses the word "that" in an out-
right inflationary manner: 87 overall, alternating conditional and demonstra-
tive pronoun (by way of comparison, Holmes made use of the pronouns "which"
and "this" 8 and 9 times respectively). The passage in the text which structural-
ly comes closest to the one discussed here, is one where he uses the second that
as a demonstrative pronoun: "[One of the leaflets in question] says that there is
only one enemy of the workers of the world, and that is capitalism." Abrams,
250 U.S. at 625 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
However, such arguments are more closely related to speculation than to
stringent demonstration. It is far more important to see that Blasi's effort to
find flaws in the design of Holmes's metaphor in order to avoid the alternative
of attributing epistemological and moral nihilism to Holmes's thought. See
Luban, supra note 111, at 475. Because even if it is to be assumed that Holmes
was "for all his brilliance and eloquence... simply ... not a systematic thinker"
it would be quite remarkable had Holmes not been able to arrange his language
in a coherent manner over two lines and was to directly contrast his concept of
truth, defined as the result of open competition with another, significantly dif-
ferent, concept of truth. Blasi, supra note 90, at 23. Not only according to the ar-
gumentative structure, but also against the backdrop of Holmes's skeptical posi-
tion, such a result is in need of a more compelling reasoning.
121 Which is not to imply that this position had in any way been capable of win-
ning a majority inside or outside the Supreme Court at the time judgment was
delivered. See John Wigmore, Abrams v. U. S. Freedom of Speech and Freedom of
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liefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accept-
ed by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of
free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their
way."12 2 Or, as he once remarked to his friend Laski: "[I]f my fellow
citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job."123
III. CONCLUSION: THE EPISTEMIC NEUTRALITY OF THE MARKETPLACE
Similar to the theories of Milton, Mill, and Brandeis, it may be
objected that Holmes's perception of the "power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market,"124 all along with its
characteristics, sometimes marked as cynical,125 does not possess the
capacity ascribed to it by Kennedy's plurality opinion in Alvarez.126
After all, Holmes himself underlines in Abrams that he was "speaking
only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which were all that
were uttered here."127
Still, this objection would miss the point: Even if the specific
legal argument was confined by the subject matter of the case, the
potential of Holmes's approach is not exhausted by that.128 A con-
Thuggery in Wartime and Peace-time, 14 ILL. L. REv. 539, 561 (1920) ("In the
transcendental realms of philosophic and historical discussion by closet jurists,
these expressions might pass. But when found publicly recorded in an opinion
of the Supreme Guardians of that Constitution, licensing propaganda which in
the next case before the court may be directed against that Constitution itself,
this language is ominous indeed.").
122 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
123 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski
(March 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916-1935 248, 249 (Mark deWolfe Howe ed.,
1953).
1
24 Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
125 See Blasi, supra note 75, at 694.
126 See Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90
NYU L. REv. 1160, 1166 and 1173 (2015).
127 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 631 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
128 In particular, Holmes subsequently did not perceive statements of fact as ex-
cluded from First Amendment protection. See Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138,
140-41 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Leach, Holmes considered the ban on
advertisement for pharmaceutical products "recommended and prescribed by
leading physicians throughout the civilized world for nervous weakness, gen-
eral debility, sexual decline, or weakened manhood and urinary disorders ...
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sistent perception of the marketplace theory not nly stands against
authoritative valuation on moral or ideological grounds but also on
an epistemic level.129
As stated above, Holmes's approach distinctly is not designed
to uncover truth by free debate. Consequently, Holmes does not offer
a foundation of free speech by an "argument from truth,"30 as we
may conclude for Milton, Mill, and Brandeis: They value free speech
as dialectical process of finding truth and exclude questions of fact
from this process from the very outset, as the truth of these state-
ments may only be a datum of the discourse, not its result13
Quite the contrary, Holmes's perception of a "competition of
the market" rather has to be regarded as an argument against
truth.132 According to his theory, free speech does not serve any
function in an open process of truth-seeking. For Holmes, the dis-
course as such has to be isolated from interference by public authori-
ties.
sleeplessness and rundown system" to be in violation of the First Amendment.
Id. at 139, 141 ("Usually private swindling does not depend upon the post office.
If the execution of this law does not abridge freedom of speech, I do not quite
see what could be said to do so.").
129See Gey, supra note 87, at 20.
130 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 20 (Reprnt. ed.,
1984); see also ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7 (2d. ed. 2005).
131 Only in this context phrases like "[t]o misrepresent fact is to corrupt the
source of opinion" become comprehensible. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARV. L. REv. 33, 92 (1931-1932).
132 It may be objected that some academics perceive Holmes in close vicinity to
the consensus theory of truth; and equation which is correct as far as discursive
redemption of the claim to validity of the statement in question and its inherent
infinite moment are concerned. See Schauer, supra note 26, at 908); see also
Jilrgen Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien, in VORSTUDIEN UND ERGANZUNGEN ZUR
THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS 127, 137 (1984).
However, both approaches differ far too significantly from one another
regarding what is to be considered true and what comes along with that to
make a comparison useful. If one defines with RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A
CRITICAL THEORY - HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 65 (1981) the truth of the
statement according to the consensus theory "that it would be the one on which
all agents would agree if they were to discuss all of human experience in abso-
lutely free and uncoerced circumstances for an indefinite period of time," it is to
be countered by referring to RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 221
(Reprnt. ed., 1993) (1990) ("Holmes's metaphor for freedom of speech ... rests
on skepticism about the possibility of settling disputes by reason.").
Protection of the marketplace as an end in itself thus consist-
ently transposes the epistemic humility of a man"as who said of him-
self "I don't believe or know anything about absolute truth,"134 and
who was supposed to have difficulties "even with the 'truth' of the
sum of two and two"1 3 5 into a coherent normative model.
If free speech is to provide a forum for the exchange of prop-
ositions which are to be considered true if accepted,136 this model,
according to its very structure, does not allow for a hierarchy of
statements, as presupposed by the approaches discussed before.1 37 If
truth is the, if ever, temporary"38 result of a process, the process it-
self, being supplied by allegedly untrue statements (i.e., statements
that have not proven to be successful so far) is not consonant with
such prior attributions. Quite the opposite: To disallow a statement
to enter this process while only the result of the process may serve
as an indicator of its valuation and thus of its admission, perverts the
process as such.
Thus, Holmes's metaphor of free speech as forum of an open
competition of statements on equal footing39 shapes the perception
of a morally, ideologically, and epistemically neutral state:140 a state
in which "no such thing as a false idea" exists.141 Consistently, the
133 1 have to thank Andreas Th. Miller for a more amiable phrasing instead of
describing Holmes as "epistemological agnostic," See, e.g., Gey, supra note 87, at
8.
134 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Letter from Justice Holmes to John Wu (June 16,
1923), in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED
LETTERS AND PAPERS 164, 165 (Harry C. Shriver ed. 1936).
135 Josal Rogat & James M. O'Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion -
The Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1372 (1984).
136 See BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 214 (2002).
137 See Gey, supra note 87, at 21-22.
138 See Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 881-882 (1963).
139 See, e.g., Robert Cover, The Left, the Right and the First Amendment: 1918-
1928, 40 MD. L. REV. 349, 373 (1981).
140 Arnold Loewy, Freedom of Speech as a Product of Democracy, 27 U. RICH. L.
REV. 427, 429 (1993).
141 But cf, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("We begin
with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as
a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its cor-
rection not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of
other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.").
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central tenet of free expression is not only "that the government
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas,"142 but to postulate
the epistemic neutrality of the marketplace of discussion, where "the
intellect is free as long as it deceives without causing any harm."143
Alvarez showed the way to achieve this goal.
142 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978).
143 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, UBER WAHRHEIT UND LOGE IM AUSERMORALISCHEN SINN 321
(Karl Schlechta ed., Werke III 1954) (own translation).
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